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Note
Can Government Buy Everything?:
The Takings Clause and the Erosion of the
"Public Use" Requirement
Jennifer J. Kruckeberg*
Whether you know it or not, your house is for sale.
Corporations, using cities as their personal real estate agents,
are proposing the following assignment: "Find me your most
prominent location, get rid of what is on it, help me pay for it,
and maybe you will be lucky enough to have me move to your
city." Such is the state of the current eminent domain power.
The Fifth Amendment authorizes the government to take
private property for "public use" if just compensation is paid.1
The modern framework, however, extends beyond any power
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution. 2 In fact, "as
urban densities increase and inner-city redevelopment
opportunities become more limited, there will be increasing
temptations for public agencies to use their power on behalf of
3
select private interests."
The government's power to exercise this threat has
expanded considerably. 4 Courts used to construe the "public
use" limitation strictly, meaning a taking could not occur if the
new use was not accessible to the general public. 5 Over time,
courts increasingly construed public use to be synonymous with
public purpose, opening the door to a broad range of takings for
private interests. 6 The justification of public benefit resulting
7
in higher tax revenue for public coffers now suffices.
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1998,
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Professor Ann
Burkhart and the editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their valuable
commentary.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend V.
2. See infra notes 21, 164 and accompanying text.
3. Editorial, Courts and Condemnation, DENVER POST, July 27, 2001, at
B8.
4. See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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This Note will demonstrate that the modern public use
doctrine is badly flawed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
exemplified the problem by validating the City of Richfield's
condemnation of homes and businesses at a prime intersection
to pave the way for the Best Buy corporate headquarters.8 Part
I of this Note traces the origins of eminent domain, the
evolution of the "public use" language of the Takings Clause,
and the definitions of the term "blight" that describes
conditions often used as justifications to condemn private
property. Part II examines the changing face of federal and
state court applications of the public use doctrine, highlighting
the Minnesota model. Part II ends with a comparison of the
levels of scrutiny courts exercise to review condemnation
proceedings.
Part III discusses proposals designed to
ameliorate the damage that the current broad application of
public use inflicts on the concept of private property. This Note
concludes that implementation of the proposed solutions is
imperative to fill what has become a gaping loophole in private
property rights under the Constitution.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE PUBLIC
USE REQUIREMENT
A. ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

"Eminent domain" is the government's power to take
private property without the owner's consent; this power is
limited by the condition that such property must "be taken for
public use" and not "without just compensation." 9 Eminent
domain existed in the common law prior to the adoption of the
Takings Clause of the Constitution.1 0

8. See Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d
662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Most state constitutions have similar
provisions. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 20; IL.
CONST. art. I, § 15; KY. CONST. § 13; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 13; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29.
10. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875) (noting that the
government's eminent domain power was recognized at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution); Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public
Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49, 53 (1999) (referencing the English legislative
practice and natural law tradition); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH L. REV. 553, 555 (1972) (explaining that many
eminent domain principles developed from judge-made law).
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B. APPLICATION OF THE TAKING CLAUSE'S TERM "PUBLIC USE"
Although the power of eminent domain existed in English
common law, the English tradition did not contain a "public
use" requirement. 1 I Without guidance from common law
precedent, the "public use" phrase in the U.S. Constitution
lacks historical application and does not expressly define the
2
meaning or the reasoning behind inclusion of the phrase.
Legal scholars repeatedly fail to find evidence articulating
what
13
the Framers wanted the public use language to require.
To resolve this ambiguity, the Supreme Court integrated
its interpretation of the public use requirement into the
eminent domain power. 14 Traditionally, the power to acquire
private land for parks, sewer systems, highways and roads, or
hospitals for communal access by the general public was
accepted to be necessary for an evolving society. 15 The broad
extension of the public use requirement through case law to
incorporate private economic redevelopment projects causes
debate over the scope of this power. 16 This debate may be
inevitable because state statutes now validate eminent domain
under the guise of public use for takings that were previously
17
prohibited under the strict interpretation of public use.
Under the modern view, the public use language of the Takings
Clause requires only that the public derive some conceivable
benefit from the taking. 18 The public does not have to have
11. See Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public
Use in Order to Effectuate a "Public-PrivateTaking"--A Proposal to Redefine
"Public Use," LAW REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 639, 644 (2000) (citing

Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 565). The elements of the power of eminent
domain at English common law were comprised of "(1) an act of Parliament
that (2) authorized a compulsory taking of an estate in land." Id. (emphasis
added).
12. Id.
13. See Kulick, supra note 11, at 644; Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 591.
14. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416-17 (1896)
(holding that the taking of railroad land for a grain elevator was not a
sufficient public use to be valid).
15. See, e.g., 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[3] (Julius L.
Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1998) (noting that eminent domain actions which enlarge
public resources constitute a valid use).
16. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
17. See NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 15, § 7.03[10] [b].
18. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit
on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1985) (emphasizing the

limitlessness of the definition of potential benefits by stating that "'[p]ublic
use' has ... been defined so broadly that little if anything will not fall within
the meaning of the term").
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actual access to the acquired property. 19
The narrow
requirement that a taking must strictly be for literal use by the
public has largely been abandoned. 20 Legal commentators now
2
use the terms public use and public purpose interchangeably. '
C. ASSESSING BLIGHT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR PUBLIC USE
CONDEMNATIONS

The removal of blight is a primary example of what

government entities consider a public purpose. 22 Consequently,
many condemning authorities justify a taking by defining the
area as "blighted."23 Blight is generally defined as "'the state of
being a slum, a breeding ground for crime, disease, and

19. See id. at 1280.
20. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205 (1978) (noting that the broad view of public
use has returned to favor).
21. See, e.g., Kulick, supra note 11, at 641 (exhibiting the similarity of the
terms by describing them together as "the public use finding, or the public
purpose that the government offers in order to condemn property under the
Constitution").
Other legal commentators dispute the legitimacy of substituting public
purpose for the term "public use" under the Constitution. For example, Roger
Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, in REGULATORY TAKINGS:
RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 7, 17 (1994), stated,
The phrase "for public use" has been commonly misinterpreted in two
respects: first, the Clause as a whole has been read as an affirmative
prohibition of all takings (whether or not compensated) not for public
use; and, second, it has been read to mean "for legitimate public
purpose," so that there is no longer any "use" requirement.
Id. The author further distinguished the two terms:
The word "use" is and was distinct from the word "purpose," and there
is no reason to suppose that the Framers used the former when they
meant the latter ....
"Use" has had a much different-and narrow
and more specific-meaning than general purpose, rationale, or
reason for hundreds of years ....
In sum, [use] means employing with
a purpose; it does not mean purpose.
Id. at 18.
22. See Gideon Kanner, That Was the Year That Was: Recent
Developments in Eminent Domain Law, 87, 89-92 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of
Study, Aug. 17-19, 2000), WL SF08 ALI-ABA 87 ("[A] determination of blight
is also a determination that the constitutional criterion of 'public use' has been
met.").
23. See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev.
Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the city's
findings of blight were based on a disingenuous statistical analysis that
defined an area as blighted when fewer than two percent of the buildings were
actually unsafe or unhealthy); Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 272-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that a city's undefined
claims of blight in an affluent community were not supported by evidence).

2002]

CAN GOVERNMENT BUY EVERYTHING?

547

unhealthful living conditions.' 24 In the past few decades,
cooperation between federal, state, and local governments and
private corporations resulted in the redevelopment of many
derelict areas. 25
Cities across the nation rebuilt their
downtown areas by demolishing public housing developments
to make way for industrial areas or newer, upscale rental
buildings. 26 The clearing of large parcels of land for these
redevelopment schemes, aided by significant financial
27
assistance from the federal government, is controversial.
These projects often eliminate seemingly satisfactory properties
28
along with those that are indisputably blighted.
29
Most states have statutory provisions that define blight.
24. R. Bruce Tepper, A Thousand Points of Blight: Redevelopment
Agencies Are on Notice That Continued Misuse of Their Powers Could
Endanger the Future of All Redevelopment Programs, L.A. LAWYER, Mar.
2001, at 34 (2001) (quoting Hudson Hayes Luce, Note, The Meaning of Blight:
A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 393

(2000)).
25. See 1AM. JUR. 2DProofofFacts401 §1 (1974).
26. See Keasha Broussard, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain:
Urban Revitalization Against the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 107 (2000) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT
AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 148, 151-54 (1968); Pam
Belluck, Razing the Slums to Rescue the Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998,
at A26).
27. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right for California
Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1008 (2001). Professor Gideon
Kanner of Loyola Law School is a leading critic of eminent domain abuses that
facilitate redevelopment. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Scrutinizing 'Public' Use,
NAT'L. L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A21 (stating that in 1999 the National Law
Journal "took an editorial position criticizing abuses of the eminent domain
power that, in disregard of the Fifth Amendment's 'public use' limitation,
consisted of taking unoffending property and reconveying it to large profitmaking corporations out to make a buck").
Lawrence Friedman also
considered the psychological consequences of the condemnations, arguing that
proponents of these clearance minded bulldozing projects also fail to
adequately consider their social impact and effect on residents. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 26, at 150-51.
28. See Tepper, supra note 24, at 36 (noting that redevelopment of nonblighted areas leads to higher service costs in such areas, which results in a
loss of services to other areas).
29. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 469.002, subd. 11 (2001) that defines a
"blighted area" as
any area with buildings or improvements which, by reason of
dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or
design, lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities, excessive land
coverage, deleterious land use, or obsolete layout, or any combination
of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals,
or welfare of the community.
For similar definitions by other states, see, for example, ALASKA STAT. §
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Broad definitions can empower state legislatures to enact
sweeping redevelopment schemes. 30 The language of these
provisions typically characterize such areas as suffering from
defective or inadequate layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions,
deterioration, improper subdivision, conditions that endanger
life by fire or other causes, or any such combination of factors
significantly impairing the growth of such an area, thereby
constituting a threat to the public health, safety, morals, and
31
welfare.
To decide whether an area is blighted, courts generally rule
in accordance with the determinations of local boards and
construe the term broadly. 32 There are limits, however. Aside
from most courts' tendencies to accept a redevelopment
authority's findings, proof that the area contains criteria
generally included in a checklist of blighted conditions is
necessary. 33
While seemingly well intentioned, blight
determinations are subjective and thus vulnerable to abuse.
Because the elimination of blight is one of the most common
ways municipalities justify a public purpose to condemn private
land, the magnitude of that abuse is potentially large.

18.55.950 (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. 31-25-103 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
163.340 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 8-4-3 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-1
(2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-1-3 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4625
(2002); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.72 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-5801.1 (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1331 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-9-103
(2001).
30. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts 401 § 2 (1974).
31. See id. (citing a similar definition of blight employed in ARIZ. REV.

STAT. § 36-1471(2)).

This language is similar to the Minnesota statute

defining blight in supra note 29. The rationale behind the alleviation of these
conditions is that the areas have declining or stagnant tax revenues and
demand increased services to fight crime and other health and safety
problems. See Tepper, supra note 24, at 36.
32. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 401 § 3 (1974).

33. This proof usually requires evidence of one of the following:
Predominance of dilapidated, improperly maintained buildings;
[i]ncompatible mixture of residential and nonresidential buildings;
[ilnadequacy of streets; [1]arge number of irregularly shaped lots;
[o]vercrowding of buildings on parcels; [p]resence of fire and rescue
hazards; [d]isproportionate number of fire calls; [dlisproportionate
number of arrests; [dlisproportionate number of persons receiving
public assistance; [d]isproportionate rate of disease; unusual

conditions of title.
Id. § 5.
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II. TAKINGS OF PRIVATE LAND TO BENEFIT OTHER
PRIVATE PARTIES AND THE MODERN PUBLIC USE
CLAUSE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC
USE

In the early twentieth century, the public use language in
the Fifth Amendment substantiated the widespread conviction
that condemnation authority to take private land required a
literal use for the public. 34 Consistent with this belief, in some
early takings challenges involving disputes over the public use
requirement, the Supreme Court held that the judiciary should
make the ultimate determination whether to construe a use as
public or private. 35 Interestingly, in other early decisions, the
Court made contradictory statements expressing that the
authority to make the determination was properly left to the
legislature. 36 Nonetheless, the Court established that a taking,
via the authority of a municipality providing the property
owner with just compensation, is unconstitutional if it is for a
37
purely private function.
Following these initial limitations on the public use
doctrine, the Supreme Court's next ruling paved the way for
broad discretion by cities to construe urban and regional
planning initiatives to be public uses. The Court's decision in
Berman v. Parker38 set a broad standard for courts to give

34. Examples included roads, parks, and dams. See RUTHERFORD H.
PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 331
(1996).
35. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930); see also
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (allowing the
Court to overturn the legislative determination and concluding that the taking
in question only benefited a private owner). The Court added that the
condemnation was invalid because "[t]he taking by a State of the private
property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the
private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the

Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."
Id.
36.

See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923)

("That the necessity and expediency of taking property for public use is a
legislative and not a judicial question is not open to discussion."); Bragg v.
Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919) ("Where the intended use is public, the
necessity and expediency of the taking may be determined by such agency and
in such mode as the state may designate.").
37. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 164 U.S. at 417.
38. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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deference to any and all conceptions of public use designated by
municipalities. 39 The issue was whether private land in an
economically depressed area could be transferred to a private
party for redevelopment.4 0 Congressional legislation allowed
private developers to acquire private land pursuant to a plan
for development. 4 1 The Court held that the government's
power of eminent domain allowed it to transfer private
42
property to another private party to develop the derelict area.
Further, the Court established that the legislature's definition
43
of public use deserves judicial deference.
This holding resulted in a lenient standard easy for
municipalities to meet.44 For state governments, the objectives
within the scope of public use include benefits to the health,
safety, and welfare of citizens. 45 For the federal government,
the test simply requires a rational relationship to any of its
enumerated or implied powers. 46 Some commentators argue
that the Court's holding in Berman abandoned any restriction
on the definition of public use conceivably derived from the
47
term's inclusion in the Constitution.
39. See Mark C. Landry, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain-A Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 426 (1985) (asserting that "[t]he
1954 case of Berman v. Parker signaled a further decline in the significance of
the public use doctrine"). Further, George Skouras extended the significance
of Berman stating that "the Supreme Court has read this [public usei clause
out of the Constitution." GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME
COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE REGULATORY STATE'S ACQUISITION, USE
AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 44 (1998).
40. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
41. Id. at 28-29.
42. Id. at 32-34.
43. Id. at 33.
This decision resolved the Court's earlier conflicting
statements on the matter. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
44. The ease in meeting this standard derives from the acceptance of
economic revitalization as a public use, rather than the prior requirement of a
literal use by the public, and the deference given to legislatures to determine
what are sufficient public uses. Kulick, supra note 11, at 651.
45. Lara Womack, Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 28
REAL EST. L.J. 307, 312 (2000).
46. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.11, at 482 (2d ed.
1992).
47. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161 (1985) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court
gave the [public use] limitation a mortal blow in Berman v. Parker when it
noted that 'the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive' enough to
allow the use of the eminent domain power to achieve any end otherwise
within the authority of Congress" (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33)); SKOURAS,
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The Court's ruling three decades later in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff' 8 further expanded the interpretation of
public use.49 At issue was the constitutionality of the Hawaiian
legislature's determination that land could be transferred from
a lessor to a lessee through the government's power of eminent
domain to diversify ownership of land. 50 The Court held that
the ownership of nearly half the State's land by only seventytwo individuals justified such a transfer under the Takings
Clause. 51 Realigning the skewed real estate market constituted
a legitimate public purpose that met the rational relationship
52
test.
The Midkiff ruling invited cursory judicial review of state
legislatures' public use designations, rationalizing the
confiscation of private land by the government for private
development.5 3 The rational basis test is not only easily met,
but under this measure it is almost impossible that any public
purpose endorsed by the legislature will
not be upheld under
54
the arbitrary and capricious standard.

supra note 39, at 44; Landry, supra note 39, at 426.
There is some limitation on the public use doctrine of the eminent domain
power that remains relatively undisturbed in the United States. The
government generally may not use its eminent domain power to take more
land than is needed for a particular project for the sole purpose of later
reselling it for a profit. See PLATT, supra note 34, at 331. While this practice,
known as "excess condemnation" or "recoupment," has been used in Europe,
notably with Baron Georges Haussmann's legendary rebuilding of Paris in the
late nineteenth century, the United States generally rejects speculation in the
land market to recover monies put into the adjoining land development as an
inappropriate use of the eminent domain power. See id.; see also Piedmont
Triad Reg'l Water Auth. v. Sumner Hills Inc., 543 S.E.2d 844, 847 (N.C. 2001)
(noting that the practice of recoupment is "disfavored in American courts
because it denies due process to landowners").
48. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
49. See Kulick, supra note 11, at 651.
50. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231-32.
51. Id. at 232, 241-43.
52. Id. at 241-43. Despite the lenient holding, the Court did rebuke a
taking solely for a private interest by stating that "[a] purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve
no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void." Id. at 245.
53. See Kulick, supra note 11, at 652 n.83 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
242).
54. See id. (arguing that the rational basis test invites creative legislating
that merely provides the illusion that a taking has a public purpose).
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1. 99 Cents Only Stores v. LancasterRedevelopment Agency:
The First Federal Post-Berman Case to Reject a Condemnation
as Inconsistent with Public Use
A decision by the United States District Court for the
District of California marks the first time a federal court
invalidated a municipality's public use justification in a
condemnation proceeding since the lenient standards set by the
Supreme Court in Berman and Midkiff.55 In 99 Cents Only
Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 56 the issue was
whether the city of Lancaster's proposal to allow retailer Costco
to expand into adjacent retail space occupied by its competitor,
57
99 Cents Only Stores, constituted a valid public purpose.
Costco threatened to leave Lancaster, taking jobs and tax
revenue with it if the eminent domain proceeding was not
successful. 58 This created an economic incentive for the city to
59
concede to Costco's demands.
Unconvinced by the city's rationales, the court rejected the
condemnation action as unconstitutional in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. 60 Even though it used the relaxed rational
relationship standard designated in Midkiff, the court
nevertheless held that allowing Costco's expansion into the
headquarters of its competitor under the guise of an alleged
public purpose would strip the public use provision of the

55. See Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 993 (recognizing that "[a]fter Berman v.
Parker,federal courts have never rejected a condemnation of private property
for want of a public use"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 95-96 (1986) (conducting a study of the employment of
public use and finding that all federal cases since 1954 found that a taking
served a public use as well as 83.8% of all state appellate cases).
56. No. CV 00-07572 SVW, 2001 WL 811056 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2001).
57. Id. at *2-3.
58. Id. at *2.
59. See id. at *2. The removal of anchor tenants from so called "power
centers" can be devastating to the viability of such ventures if a new tenant
cannot be found for the site. See generally Raymond G. Truitt, Fe Fi Fo Fum:
Retail Giants Rule Power Centers, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 38-42
(discussing the unique characteristics of this nascent form of retail
development).
60. 99 Cents Only Stores, 2001 WL 811056, at *6. The court also held that
the issue was not moot simply because Lancaster had withdrawn its
condemnation proceeding against 99 Cents Only Stores. Id. at *4. "It is well
established ... that a case is not rendered moot where, as here, a defendant
voluntarily ceases the allegedly unlawful activity in response to a lawsuit but
is otherwise free to return to it at any time." Id. at *3 (citing Native Vill. of
Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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Takings Clause of all meaning. 6' The court also rejected the
city's contention that the threatened loss of Costco could cause
future blight, holding that the argument was entirely
speculative and an inadequate basis for a taking.62 With this
enterprising holding, the court in 99 Cents Only Stores was the
first federal court to set a boundary on legitimate motives
allowed by the lenient rational basis
standard for public use
63
established in Berman and Midkiff.
2. Cottonwood ChristianCenter v. Cypress Redevelopment
Agency
Another California federal district court case bolstered 99
Cents Only Stores's invalidation of a taking for a private party
under the guise of public use. In Cottonwood ChristianCenter
v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 64 the court granted a church
an injunction against the city of Cypress to prevent it from
65
transferring the church's property to Costco for a retail store.
66
Remarkably, Costco was again the city's intended beneficiary.
While the church primarily argued it was the victim of land use

61. See id. at *5. While citing the "rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose" language from Midkiff, the court also referred to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that an avowed public purpose is not acceptable if it is
"palpably without reasonable foundation." Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
62. Id. at *6. The purpose of the State of California's Community
Redevelopment Law is to remedy existing blight, implying the inadequacy of a
rationale based on the speculative elimination of potential future blight. See
id. (citing Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Beach-Courchesne v. City of
Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).
63. Legal commentators cite this decision as a further indication that
there may be a burgeoning change in judicial attitude away from the
unlimited scope of the public use doctrine. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, The
Development Score, NATL. L.J., July 30, 2001, at A21 (listing a series of recent
decisions limiting public use justifications as evidence of the change); Dean
Starkman, More Courts Rule Cities Misapply Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J.,
July 23, 2001, at B1 (noting that the presiding judge in 99 Cents Only Stores
wrote that "[tihe evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster's
condemnation efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the
naked transfer from one private party to another" and that "[sluch conduct
amounts to an unconstitutional taking purely for private purposes").
64. No. SACV0260DOCANX, 2002 WL 1827845 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2002).
65. Id. at *1, 23.
66. See id. at *6; see also Evan Halper, Cities Grab Land for Revenue, But
Judges are Slapping Their Hands, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at B8 (noting
that in order to raise additional revenue through sales taxes, many cities are
trying to draw big retailers such as Costco).

554
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discrimination against religious organizations, prohibited by
the First Amendment, 67 the court also based the granting of the
injunction on its skepticism that the taking served a legitimate
public purpose. 68 Noting the similarity between the scenario in
99 Cents Only Stores and the instant case, the court asserted
that both instances involved the "naked transfer of property
from one private party to another. '69
The court also
emphasized that "[c]ourts must look beyond the government's
purported public use to determine whether that is the genuine
reason or if it is merely pretext." 70 When the city argued that
the taking was justified because the land was blighted, the
court dismissed the argument under the strict scrutiny review
employed in First Amendment cases. 7 1 The court expressed
doubt that the blight justification was a "genuinely-held
purpose" and stated that it hardly seemed compelling. 72 The
court's skepticism of the city's explanations provides support
that courts are becoming increasingly critical of public use
justifications.
Aside from this enterprising precedent, however, Berman
and Midkiff have not been formally overruled or even limited.
The resulting lenient treatment of the public use standard
survives in federal courts. Dissension by lower federal courts,
exhibited in 99 Cents Only Stores and Cottonwood Christian
Center, and evidence of abuses recognized by the judiciary in
state courts could encourage the Supreme Court to reintroduce
the original intent behind the public use requirement.

B.

MODERN PUBLIC USE IN STATE COURTS

1. Minnesota Courts' Treatment of Public Use Justifications
An examination of the interpretation of public use by
Minnesota state courts is illustrative of the problems created

67.
68.

Cottonwood ChristianCtr., 2002 WL 1827845, at *10-18.
See id. at *20; Commentary, Cypress Dealt Blow in Church Land Case,

ORANGE CTY. REG., Aug. 7, 2002, 2002 WL 5456674.
69. Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 2002 WL 1827845, at *20 (quoting 99
Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, No. CV 00-07572 SVW, 2001
WL 811056, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2001)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at *18-19.

72. Id. at *19. The blight determination was twelve years old and the city
had not taken any action regarding blight until after the church purchased the
property. Id.
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when states take the U.S. Supreme Court's indulgent standard
to extremes. The Minnesota model of the public use doctrine
sets an unusually lenient standard favoring condemners. 73 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that "[o]ur scope of review
in a condemnation case is very narrow."74 In addition,
Minnesota courts give great weight to the findings of the
condemning authority. 75 Under this broad construction, public
use is synonymous with public purpose. 76 Minnesota courts
enforce this construction of public use by holding that a public
entity can use its eminent domain power to transfer property
from one private owner to another to further any conceivable
public purpose. 77 This practice follows the guidelines set forth
in Midkiff of using the rational basis test, with deference given
to purposes outlined by legislatures as well as the
municipalities
that
conduct
the
condemnations. 78
Furthermore, Minnesota appellate courts view public purpose
as a question of fact and apply the clearly erroneous standard
79
when reviewing lower court decisions.

73. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing
and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 169 (1998)
(stating that "[w]hile some states have tried to limit the potential misuse of
eminent domain power in economic development areas.. . Minnesota fail[s] to
place any restrictions upon a redevelopment agency's power to condemn"); see
also Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The Use of Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REV. 783, 803 (1999) (citing the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision in City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 762
(Minn. 1986) (en banc), in a national review of eminent domain decisions as an
example of a court that used an "extremely deferential" standard of review).
74. County of Dakota v. City of Lakeville, 559 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (citing City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d at 763).
75. See, e.g., Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d
662, 666 (Minn.Ct. App. 2001), affd, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
76. Id. at 668 (citing City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d at 763).
77. See id.
78. Minnesota courts followed this position in past decisions, including
upholding the validity of the public use justification for the transfer of private
land to a private party. See, e.g., Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency (MCDA) v.
Opus N.W., L.L.C., 582 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); City of Duluth,
390 N.W.2d at 763; Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 104
N.W.2d 864, 867, 875 (Minn.1960).
79. See Opus, 582 N.W.2d at 599 (citing State by Humphrey v. Byers, 545
N.W.2d 669, 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)).
Because the clearly erroneous
standard allows the reversal of lower courts' findings only if they are entirely
without basis, it is particularly difficult to meet. See N. States Power Co. v.
Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975) (en banc) (asserting that
"clearly erroneous" is defined as "manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole").
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The Minnesota Supreme Court in City of Duluth v. State8 0
exhibited this minimal standard of review of a municipality's
public purpose.8 1 The court gave deference to the condemning
authority's proposed construction of a paper mill that would
provide jobs to an economically depressed area.8 2 Concurrently,
the court noted that its evaluation would consist only of a
review of the record, and a sufficient public purpose would be
found if any evidence of public use was present, no matter how
83
diminutive or informal.
In a more recent case, Minneapolis Community
Development Agency (MCDA) v. Opus Northwest, L.L.C., 84 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals further exhibited its deference to
municipalities' definitions of public use.8 5 The court permitted
the city to allow a mid-priced retailer to take over another
commercial landowner's property in a prime, downtown
location to ensure the downtown's future vitality with lucrative
economic activity. 86 The city's main justification for meeting
the public purpose requirement was providing the convenience
of moderately priced shopping downtown to the central
business district's workers.8 7 Another justification was that
purchasing a site as unique as the subject site on the open
market would be too expensive.8 8 The city did not attempt to
argue that the area was blighted, but rather emphasized the
public benefit in improving the tax base.8 9 The court agreed
that the economic benefits constituted a valid public use, opting

80.
81.
82.
83.

390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986) (en banc).
Id. at 762.
See id. at 773.
See id. at 763 (citing Hous. & Redev. Auth., 104 N.W.2d at 874).

84. 582 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
85. See id. at 598 ("'Great weight must be given to the determination of
the condemning authority, and the scope of review is narrowly limited. If it
appears that the record contains some evidence, however informal, that the
taking serves a public purpose, there is nothing left for the courts to pass
upon." (quoting City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d at 763-64)).
86. Id. at 598, 601. The city wanted to locate a Dayton Hudson
Corporation's Target store on Nicollet Mall to attract shoppers. See John
Windrow, Downtown Target Store OK'd [sic] Without Office Tower, STAR TRIB.,
June 27, 1998, at Al. Downtown Minneapolis's Nicollet Mall is located in the
center of its central business district. The City Council hoped to provide a
niche where workers could shop for essentials on their lunch hours and

provide substantial sales tax revenue, as Target stores are profitable. See id.
87.
88.
89.

See Opus, 582 N.W.2d at 599-600.
See id. at 600, 602 n.4; Kanner, supra note 22, at 99.
See Opus, 582 N.W.2d at 598; Kanner, supra note 22, at 100.
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again for a broad definition of the term. 90 It agreed with the
city that the benefits of the mid-priced retailing function would
be preferable to the large office building the property owner
proposed to construct. 9 1 Thus, a city's mere preference for one
redevelopment plan over another based on economic
motivations suffices as a valid public use in Minnesota.
a. Housing & Redevelopment Authority v. Walser Auto Sales,
Inc.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals's decision in Housing &
Redevelopment Authority v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc.92 approved
a redevelopment scheme that embroiled the city of Richfield in
controversy since it began negotiations with Best Buy to
relocate its corporate headquarters to the city.93 The proposed
site is arguably one of the most prominent and economically
94
viable intersections in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Construction of the complex required the removal of sixty-eight
homes and apartment buildings, thirteen small businesses, and
95
three auto dealerships.

90. See Opus, 582 N.W.2d at 599; Kanner, supra note 22, at 100.
91. See Opus, 582 N.W.2d at 600. One legal commentator disagreed with
this decision and described it as "most egregious" and a "grotesque
extrapolation of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Berman v. Parker."
Kanner, supra note 22, at 99-100.
92. 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
2002). For more on the subsequent history, see infra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text.
93. The redevelopment site is at the intersection of Interstate 494 and
Penn Avenue in Richfield, a first ring suburb of Minneapolis, Minnesota. See
Dan Wascoe, Jr., Best Buy, Richfield in HeadquartersTalks, STAR TRIB., Sept.
3, 1999, at D1.
94. Paul Walser, owner of the Walser auto dealership, confirmed the
desirability of the location: "We are the second-largest Buick dealership in the
country; while we would like to take credit personally for this accomplishment,
it is largely due to the strength of our location." Paul Walser, Commentary,
Richfield's Rush to Help Best Buy, STAR TRIB., Mar. 2, 2001, at A25.
95. Dan Wascoe, Jr., Best Buy Proposal Draws Fire in Richfield: City
Council Hears Opinions of Walser Consultant, Others, STAR TRIB., Sept. 14,
2000, at B2. In addition to the loss of homes and businesses, the project
required the city to finance a twenty-one million dollar reconstruction of the
Penn Avenue bridge across Interstate 494 to accommodate the increased
traffic. Laurie Blake, Penn Avenue Bridge Project Won't Mess Up Holidays,
STAR TRIB., July 19, 2001, at B2. The bridge is only one of two in the Twin
Cities and is designed in a special "X" shape to accommodate fifteen percent
more traffic than a traditional freeway bridge, providing six lanes with space
for up to eight more. Laurie Blake, New Bridge Has Uncommon Design and
an Eye Toward 1-494"s Future, STAR TRIB., July 28, 2002, at B3.
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At issue was whether the redevelopment scheme
constituted a legitimate public purpose sufficient to validate
the taking. 96 The court cited a "deferential scope of review" to
justify the broad construction of the term "public use" used to
uphold the condemnation. 97 The court reiterated that public
use can be satisfied even if the land is turned over to a private
entity. 98 Ironically, however, in an appeal to use tax increment
financing to fund the redevelopment project in Walser, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed itself,holding the funding
scheme invalid, because a large amount of land was improperly
included in the redevelopment area. 99 Nonetheless, the
condemnation stood despite the use of improper means,
because the Minnesota Supreme Court had already affirmed
it. 100
In Walser, the elimination of blight and the creation of a
lucrative tax base were held to be valid public purposes
necessary to uphold the condemnation proceeding.' 0 '
Minnesota courts clearly interpret the Supreme Court's
96. See Walser, 630 N.W.2d at 668.
97. Id. at 668 (citing City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn.
1986)).
98. Id. The court stated that "'even though a public entity... turns over
parcels [of land] to a private entity for use by that private entity, the
condemnation will, nevertheless, be constitutional if a public purpose is
furthered by such a transfer of land."' Id. (quoting City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d
at 763).
99. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 40304 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).
100. See Dana Berliner, Litigation of Challenges to Condemnations for
Private Parties in 2001-2002, at 367, 373-74 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study,
Jan. 10-12, 2002), WL SG059 ALI-ABA 367 (remarking that it was
unfortunate that this holding did not precede the affirmation of the
condemnations in case it could have affected that decision).
101. See Walser, 630 N.W.2d at 669. The court found sufficient evidence of
blight in traffic congestion, noise, and the lack of some safety factors under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. See supra note 29 for Minnesota's
definition of "blighted area."
The Best Buy corporate headquarters is expected to accommodate nearly
7,500 employees. See Dan Wascoe, Jr., Best Buy is Ready to Begin Razing in
Richfield, STAR TRIB., May 23, 2001, at B1. The cost of the project will be $160
million. Id. Following the Court of Appeals's ruling, seven lawsuits
challenging the project remained. Id. The lawsuits applied to a number of
environmental and procedural issues. Id. They included a challenge to the
lack of a public referendum on the project, two challenges to the city's use of
tax-increment financing for the project, another over the adequacy of the city's
environmental analysis of the project's impact, and a challenge to the
Metropolitan Council's decision not to designate the project as significant to
the region. Id.
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holdings in Berman and Midkiff to allow literal public use to be
subsumed by the public purpose of generating increased
revenue.
2. Other State Courts' Treatment of Public Use Justifications
Minnesota courts are not alone in their broad
interpretation of public use. In the years since the Supreme
Court's monumental holdings in Berman and Midkiff, an
examination of state court holdings outside Minnesota exhibits
a similar tendency to construe a variety of condemnation
actions by private developers against private landowners to be
in the public interest. Notably, these include constructing an
10 3
automobile assembly plant, 10 2 facilitating an auto racetrack,
building the World Trade Center, 10 4 accommodating a
professional football franchise, 0 5 extending a petroleum
pipeline, 10 6 and expanding the Kansas City International
Airport. 107 Taken in combination, these decisions could provide
further support for a broad definition of public use.
Despite these lenient holdings, other state courts have
attempted to narrow the seemingly inexorable public use
doctrine in circumstances that appeared particularly egregious.
These situations appear where the benefit to a private party at
the expense of another greatly outweighs any genuine public
benefit.
Some of these attempts arose in the past two
decades. 0 8 Furthermore, recent decisions narrowing the public
use doctrine may signal an imminent change in judicial
attitude, shifting away from the lenient standard of review. 10 9
Examining
circumstances
where
courts
held
that
redevelopment efforts did not confer a realistic benefit to the

102. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459-60 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam).
103. State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 962 P.2d
543, 554 (Kan. 1998).
104. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402,
404-05 (N.Y. 1963).
105. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 842-43 (Cal. 1982).
106. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Eakin, 357 S.W.2d 129, 134
(Mo. 1982).
107. City of Kansas City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407, 413-14 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
108. See infra Part II.B.2a-b.
109. See, e.g., Editorial, Mississippi Churning, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2002,
at A12 ("After years of slumber, citizens and courts are waking up to the
abuses eminent domain can create.").
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a. Improper Public Use Justificationsin State Courts
A Michigan court's holding provides an example of a
development project that could not reasonably be a public use.
In City of Center Line v. Chmelko, 110 the Michigan Court of
Appeals ruled that the city's use of its eminent domain power to
persuade an auto dealership not to leave by allowing it to
expand its parking lot was not a valid public purpose."' In
exercising heightened scrutiny review, 1 2 the court recognized
that the real motivation behind the city's attempted acquisition
was to facilitate good relations with the auto dealership, and
not to alleviate a parking shortage or eliminate non-existent
blight. 113 The court rejected this justification of the public use
requirement, invalidating the speculative prospect of future
jobs or additions to the commercial industrial base as
legitimate reasons for a taking." 14
In another auto related case, the Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld the rejection of a proposal to allow a Nissan car
manufacturer to take thirty acres owned by three families to
provide a parking lot and access road for its factory."15 The

110. 416 N.W.2d 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
111. Id. at 407.
112. Id. at 404. The Michigan Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam), established heightened scrutiny as the appropriate test to
use under the public use doctrine if a private party's interest is predominant.
See id. at 459-60. The court also established that the public interest must
prevail, and not be "speculative or marginal." Id. Michigan state courts can
apply stricter scrutiny to takings law than that established by the Supreme
Court's precedent; it is well-established that states may confer greater rights
on their citizens than are set by the federal constitution, but not less. See
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). As Justice Brennan pointed out,
"[sitate constitutions ... are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal law." Id.
113. See Chmelko, 416 N.W.2d at 404-05, 407.
114. See id. at 406. The court specified that the fact "[tihat the automobile
dealer is a substantial factor in the business life of the city does not permit it
to use city government to eliminate small businesses in order to facilitate its
growth." Id. at 407. But see City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 764
(Minn. 1986) (holding that the prospect of new jobs in an economically
decimated area was an appropriate public use).
115.

Mississippi Churning,supra note 109.
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state's executive director of its Development Authority
admitted that the primary justification behind his support for
the condemnation was the message that would be sent to other
companies if Nissan's wishes were not met. 11 6 The court
suggested that this blatant benefit to a private
auto
17
manufacturer was not a sufficiently public function.'
In a Delaware state court decision that invalidated a public
use justification of an eminent domain proceeding because the
private entity was the primary beneficiary, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the city of Wilmington's plan for a
public parking facility actually provided the "paramount
18
benefit" for expansion to an adjacent news-journal company.'
Approving the heightened scrutiny test used by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 19 the court also followed the U.S. Supreme Court's
earlier test in City of Cincinnati v. Vester 120 that the
determination of public use is properly a question for judicial
review, rather than the Court's later designation of deference to
121
legislative designation outlined in Berman.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court added to this growing
body of decisions that apply restrictions to the breadth of public
use by using an equation to determine the validity of the
public's benefit. 122 At issue in Merrill v. City of Manchesterwas
whether the city could condemn open forestland for
construction of an industrial park, thereby benefiting the local
economy with new jobs and an increased tax base. 123 The
state's constitution forbids condemnations that "will be
124
primarily of benefit to private persons or private uses."
116. Id. The executive director of the Mississippi Development Authority
said, "It's not that Nissan is going to leave if we don't get that land. What's
important is the message it would send to other companies if we are unable to
do what we said we would do." Id.
117.

See id.

118. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227,
231 (Del. 1986).
119. 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam). See supra note 112

for an explanation of the Michigan Supreme Court's application of heightened
scrutiny.
120. 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930). For discussion see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
121. See Wilmington ParkingAuth., 521 A.2d at 231.

122. See Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 217 (N.H. 1985).
123. See id. at 217-18.
124. Id. at 217 (citing In re Opinion of the Justices, 114 A.2d 514, 516
(1955), and interpreting Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution).
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Testing this provision, the court used a formula to add the
benefits of the new project with the benefits of removal of the
prior use and subtract the social cost of the loss of the property
in its present form.125 The result suggested that the loss of
open space that benefited the public health outweighed any
possible economic incentives. 126 Because the court did not find
a direct benefit to the public through construction of an
industrial park, it used a balancing test and concluded that the
preservation of open space provided the greater benefit to the
27
public.
In a case that similarly benefited a private enterprise, the
Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a condemnation for a
racetrack's parking lot. In Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C.,128 the court
determined that while a public benefit would accrue from the
construction of a parking facility to alleviate traffic congestion
and raise more tax revenue through increased profitability, it
was not a sufficient "public purpose" under the U.S.
Constitution's eminent domain power. 129 The court explained
the distinction by stating that almost all commercial activity
conceivably benefits the public, but this was not a public
purpose because the racetrack operated exclusively for private
30
profit. 1
125. See Merrill, 499 A.2d at 217.
126. See id. at 217-18.
127. See id. at 218-19. In a similar effort to preserve open space at the
expense of the construction of a big-box store, a New York court precluded
Home Depot from constructing one of its big-box stores. Home Depot, USA,
Inc. v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 741 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
This case did not involve a condemnation and the town itself rejected Home
Depot's site plan approval permit due to the store's unsuitability for the site.
Id. Upholding the district court under arbitrary and capricious review, the
court cited the arguments that the store's design would involve the
irretrievable removal of a forested hillside and would need to be "shoehorned"
into the proposed site that was insufficient to house the project. Id. at 275-76.
The court assessed the project's possible deleterious impact on the physical
environment and not its potential to improve the tax base. Id. at 274-76.
128. 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002).
129. Id. at 8-11.
130. Id. The court elaborated,
[MIembers of the public are not the primary intended beneficiaries of
this taking .... This condemnation clearly was intended to assist [the
racetrack] in accomplishing [its] goals in a swift, economical, and
profitable manner.... As Justice Kuehn stated in dissent in the
appellate court, "If property ownership is to remain what our
forefathers intended it to be, if it is to remain a part of the liberty we
cherish, the economic by-products of a private capitalist's ability to
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Finally, in a high profile example of public use limitations,
the New Jersey Superior Court rejected the condemnation of a
to
home for the expansion of a driveway to enable limousines 131
turn around in front of businessman Donald Trump's casino.
Despite exercising conventional standards of deferential
review, the court viewed this conveyance of private land to
Trump as outside the scope of reasonableness, because the
what could be done with the property once it
state did not limit
132
was conveyed.
In contrast to the deferential review exercised by the
federal courts, some state constitutions call for heightened
scrutiny when eminent domain purports to benefit a private
party. 33 This results in the rejection of development schemes
that would likely pass federal constitutional muster. These
incongruities showcase divergence among judicial attitudes
toward takings law.
b. Other Limitations on the Eminent Domain Power
Other courts have placed further limits on condemners'
rights in eminent domain proceedings, not just via a restriction
on the application of public use, but also by giving condemnees
more rights. In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed property owners' rights to challenge
a municipality's power of eminent domain, for lack of a public
purpose, in federal court. 134 This holding implies recognition of
the need to give property owners more options in contesting
develop land cannot justify a surrender of ownership to eminent
domain."
Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
131. See Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1998).
132. See id. at 110-11. Vera Coking, the homeowner, had lived in the
house for nearly four decades. Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain
Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use
Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 297 (2000).
Before Trump's offer to buy her property, another casino entrepreneur, Bob
Guccioni, offered to buy Coking's house for one million dollars, nearly 300%
more than its appraised value. Id. at 298. When she refused, Guccioni built a
steel and concrete structure completely around her home to intimidate her.
Id. at n.111. Guccioni then sold the structure to Trump, whose crews
demolished it. Id. Attempting to bully Coking off the property, the workers
started a fire on her roof, broke windows, removed her fire escape, and even
dropped concrete blocks through the roof, extensively damaging the home. Id.
133. See, e.g., supra notes 112, 124 and accompanying text.
134. See Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d 758, 771-72 (6th Cir.
2000).
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condemnations.
In another challenge to a condemnation action, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that a city's
presentment of its power directly to a developer was an
unlawful delegation of control. 135 The city had improperly
contracted with a redevelopment agency, giving it discretion
over the condemnation and its timing. 136 This power, the court
reminded the city, is an attribute of sovereignty. 137 Private
138
developers cannot buy this authority.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also limited the power
of a regional water authority by holding that it could only
condemn the parcel of land that was needed to construct a
water supply lake. 139 While the lake itself was clearly a public
use appropriate under eminent domain, an additional parcel
not needed for the lake was of substantial value, and the water
authority could not justify its condemnation. 140 In combination,
these developments provide further support for the growing
trend to place limits on the application of public use.
3. Judicial Review of Public Use and Scrutiny Standards
As the foregoing examples indicate, state courts are split
regarding whether strict scrutiny or rational relationship
review, employed by most federal courts, is the appropriate
standard to evaluate public use justifications. Courts favoring
strict scrutiny typically conduct an independent analysis of
potential public benefits, while courts operating under the
rational relationship standard usually find a cursory review of
the existing record sufficient. 141
Under strict scrutiny, the condemnee bears the burden of
proving the public use rationale is not legitimate. 142 Because
135. See In re Condemnation of 110 Washington St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1161
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 379 (2001).

136.

See Kanner, supra note 63, at A21.

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Piedmont Trial Reg'l Water Auth. v. Sumner Hills Inc., 543 S.E.2d
844, 849 (N.C. 2001). The water project only required approximately 48 of the
145 acre tract requested by the Water Authority. Id. at 845-46.
140. Id. at 847-49. North Carolina state law allows the condemnation of an
excess parcel only if it will retain little value after the taking. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40A-7(a) (2002).
141. See Klemetsrud, supra note 73, at 798.
142. Id. at 799 (citing NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 15, at §

7.03[12]).
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courts enter the analysis presuming a legitimate public use
even under this heightened scrutiny, the principle inquiry
concerns the predominant purpose of the taking. 143 Strict
scrutiny requires demonstration of a "compelling" need to
transfer land from one private owner to another. 144 The means
chosen to achieve this goal must also be the most narrowly
tailored to achieving this end. 145 If a private interest is merely
an incidental beneficiary, that showing is insufficient to
overcome the taking. 146 Rather, the challenger must show that
the private interest was the
primary beneficiary. 147 This is a
148
high standard to overcome.
Since the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman, lower
courts typically use the minimal standard of rational
relationship review for condemnation proceedings. 4 9 This
process places the burden on the challenger. 150 The primary
difference between the standards is that rational relationship
15
review lacks an analysis of the primary beneficiary. 1
As exhibited by the preceding discussion of the eminent
domain case law, public use as applied by the judiciary becomes
weakened to public purpose where most any minimal purpose
will suffice. Because of the deterioration in the meaning of the
public use clause, some courts now limit these condemnations,
particularly where the primary beneficiary is a private party.
These limitations may indicate an imminent change in judicial
treatment of the government's eminent domain power.
III. REMEDYING THE FLAWED PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
The evolution of the public use requirement of the eminent
domain power virtually obliterated any limitation on the
143. See id. (citing NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 15, at §
7.03[Ill][b]; Merrill, supra note 55, at 67).
144. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995).
145. Id.
146. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 458 (Mich. 1981).
147. See id. at 450-59.
148. For instance, the court in Poletown held that the proposed
condemnation did primarily benefit the public despite the fact that the
incoming corporation, General Motors, would profit greatly. Id. at 458. The
court's reasoning was based on tax revenues and jobs sure to accrue to Detroit,
a city in dire economic straits at the time of the proposal. See id. at 458.
149. See Klemetsrud, supra note 73, at 803.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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government when economic benefit will accrue. 152
Some
commentators warn that corporations may soon strip the
significance from the concept of private property. 153 While
some may term it a mere backlash, recent decisions by courts
attempting to limit cities' bulldozing power prove that judges
154
are concerned.
Though the current framework needs reform, it is
important to recognize the value of the eminent domain power
to revitalization efforts. 155 The government uses this power to
rejuvenate economically depressed areas. 156 The current
framework, however, often benefits the wealthy at the expense
of common businesses and homeowners in areas that, although
not posh, are not depressed 57 If the concept of private
property is to retain its meaning, takings reform is urgently
needed.158
A. COURTS SHOULD HEIGHTEN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONDEMNATIONS TO STRICT SCRUTINY

The first change necessary to prevent abuses in the
transfer of private land to another private party is to require
strict scrutiny review. Even though modern courts reject a
narrow interpretation of the public use language from actual
159
use by the public to merely some conceivable public purpose,
the inclusion of the words "public use" in the Takings Clause
had to mean something. 160 The language states "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
152. See supra notes 38-54, 73-107 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 178-79.
154. See supra notes 55-63, 110-38 and accompanying text.
155. Blight removal, undertaken via the government's eminent domain
power, was originally an effort to improve the public's "health and safety,"
which is a legitimate goal. See Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 992.
156. The downside of these efforts, however, may be that the aesthetic
improvement they provide may not sufficiently rehabilitate communities to
provide a better environment for the poor. Broussard, supra note 26, at 107
(citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 151).
157. See id.
158. See Womack, supra note 45, at 316 (arguing that the situation is so
dire that "there is ample evidence to suggest that local governments are
taking advantage of the discretion afforded them by this standard to condemn
property in order to generate higher property and sales tax revenues").
159. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
160. Although scholars debate the Framers' exact intentions for public use,
this debate assumes it did have some meaning. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
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compensation."16'
Following the legislative canon of
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to include one
thing is to exclude another. 62 The fact that the Takings Clause
language specifies takings for a public use, rather than a
private one, implies that private uses were not intended. In
contrast to this logical conclusion, the commonly employed
rational relationship test currently necessitates a lower
standard of review. The resulting deference to the legislature
and local boards means almost any rationale for a taking,
regardless of whether the primary benefit is to a private party
63
or the public, suffices as not arbitrary and capricious.1
Criticism of this proposal will likely focus on the increased
burden on courts resultant from more intensive review. These
measures, however, are necessary to preserve private property
rights fundamental to the Framers. 164 It seems entirely
appropriate to require this heightened standard when private
parties are allowed to circumvent the private market and
confiscate property from others, while cities often pay the "just
compensation." Likewise, because courts function to provide
equal justice under the law, the power disparities inherent in
litigation between individual homeowners and small business
owners compared with municipalities functioning at the behest
165
of corporations, also compel stricter review.
Had the Minnesota court applied strict scrutiny in Walser,
the taking attempt likely would have failed. The city would
have had the opportunity to convince the court that increased
revenue and jobs could serve as a sufficiently compelling
government interest to survive the first prong of the test. The
second prong, however, requiring that the project was the most
narrowly tailored, or least restrictive and least discriminatory

161.
162.
163.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Wright v. Brady, 889 P.2d 105, 108 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995).
The 99 Cents Only Stores case is an exception. See supra note 63 and

accompanying text.

The court found the city's rationale so egregiously

irrational that it failed the minimal rational relationship review. See supra

note 61 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 21 (discussing Roger Clegg's argument that the
Framers intended the public use clause to have a literal meaning for
condemnations).
165. The Walser case is an example of that disparity; homeowners and

business owners lost to the powerful Best Buy corporation. Hous. & Redev.
Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd,
641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
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alternative to meet that end, would likely have failed. 166
1. Conditions that Prompted Berman v. Parker are Changing
Minimal rational relationship review of proposed
redevelopment projects, established by the Supreme Court in
Berman, occurred during the 1950s, an era that fostered the
167
rise of the current American metropolitan framework.
Consisting of central cities ringed by inner and outer suburbs
connected to the hubs by a spoke-like network of highways, the
implementation of this system required the eminent domain
authority to make way for development geared toward the
automobile. Those days are gone. As exhibited by the rise in
private use takings, due to the increasing unavailability of
prime urban properties, most major metropolitan areas are
heavily built up and congested.
Because the modern
infrastructure is already established, the current need for
takings is not as great as it once was. The Supreme Court
could appropriately revisit its reasoning in Berman, the
decision that most commentators agree heralded the broad
interpretation of the public use doctrine. 68 Restricting the
doctrine would not contradict the old precedent, because the
greater need now is not to foster development, but rather to
prevent abuse by the eminent domain authority.

166. The court itself supported its decision by stating that "'[a]bsolute
necessity is not required for a finding of public purpose, rather it is enough to
find that the proposed taking is reasonably necessary or convenient for the

furtherance of a proper purpose."' Id. at 670 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Opus N.W., L.L.C., 582 N.W.2d 596, 600
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998)). If absolute necessity was required, the project would
likely have been held invalid. The court's inclusion of the term convenient is

particularly troublesome; while other courts seem to be reigning in
redevelopment proceedings under the guise of public purpose, the Minnesota
court seems to be abandoning virtually any standards. One would be hardpressed to find another area of the law where mere convenience is a sufficient
rationale for one side to prevail.

A different result in Walser would have had positive implications. First,
the courts would not have been tied up in seven subsequent lawsuits.

See

supra note 101. Secondly, public and community morale would not have been
sacrificed, decreasing the vulnerability citizens feel toward corporate giants.
Further, a limit would have been placed on the abuse of the public use

requirement.
167.
168.

See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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2. Factors Courts Should Consider When Reviewing
Condemnations
Another way for courts to raise the level of scrutiny when
reviewing condemnations is to consider reasons why upholding
the condemnations could be detrimental. These factors include
the uniqueness of land and evidence of ulterior motives.
a. Land Uniqueness
Advanced judicial review of a public use justification for a
taking requires consideration of factors not considered by the
Walser court. First, land is unique. This is one reason why
69
private property is a fundamental element of our democracy.
Land is also scarce, particularly at prime locations in densely
built metropolitan areas like the Twin Cities of Minneapolis
and St. Paul. 170 The potential for improper influence arises
when corporations are motivated to search for the most
desirable locations in a city.' 7 ' Wielding potential jobs and tax
revenue as a benefit to the public, corporations can seize these
properties, thereby having an advantage over those who bought
first on the open market. 7 2 This hypothetical became reality in
the Walser case. The intersection of 1-494 and Penn Avenue is
one of the most prominent and heavily trafficked locations in
the Twin Cities metropolitan area. 173
The ousted auto
169. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 3 (1993)
(arguing that a constitutional government's ability to survive depends on
limiting the government's power to confiscate, seize, destroy, or regulate
private property).
170. See generally Alex Schwartz, Rebuilding Downtown: A Case Study of
Minneapolis, in URBAN REVITALIZATION 163, 163-99 (Fritz W. Wagner et. al.
eds., 1995) (providing statistical analysis of the Twin Cities metropolitan
area's density and explaining challenges of facing revitalization efforts in a
densely built infrastructure).
171. Epstein describes the problems inherent when the government not
only takes private property, but then subsequently gives it to certain
individuals. See EPSTEIN, supra note 169, at 4. Epstein goes so far as to
argue that if the government does not establish the legitimacy of its taking, "it
is little better than the thief who attempts to convey good title to a third
person, especially to a purchaser in bad faith." Id.
172. See, e.g., Robyn E. Blumner, Developers Find Unfair Way to Take
Property, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at 1D, 2000 WL 26335418
(citing the case of a flower shop in downtown Pittsburgh pushed out by a $522
million redevelopment project where the owner of the shop said no one
attempted to buy his property on the open market, because "they want to pay
under the market value").
173. See Laurie Blake, Richfield May Face Traffic Challenges, STAR TRIB.,
Feb. 3, 2000, at B2 (discussing the possible consequences of exacerbating
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dealerships that operated there for decades could not replicate
the site on the open market. Best Buy connived its way into
the prominent location for its corporate headquarters. 174 This
windfall will increase the corporation's presence and
notoriety. 175 The fact that properties like this cannot be
replicated on the open market is another public policy reason
why land transfers require further scrutiny.
b. Possibilityof UlteriorMotives Requires Strict Scrutiny
Even if courts find it too burdensome to apply heightened
scrutiny to all takings cases where public use is at issue, the
higher standard should doubtless be triggered when improper
motives are evident.1 76 In contrast to the view most courts
adopt to exercise deference to legislatures in condemnation
proceedings, when the primary beneficiaries are private
interests, there is significant risk for abuse. Because the
legislature did not enact the eminent domain legislation with
the intention that a private party would benefit, but rather
envisioned a benefit for the public, this situation necessitates
heightened review. It is uniquely the function of the courts to
177
provide a check on potential abuse.
Despite this unique role, courts are often reluctant to
congestion in the already heavily-trafficked 1-494 stretch through the
Minneapolis suburbs of Eden Prairie, Bloomington, Edina, and Richfield).
174. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
175. One suggestion for site selection for power centers housing retail
giants and corporate headquarters is to select abandoned industrial facilities
or otherwise undevelopable sites.
See Truitt, supra note 59, at 40.
Municipalities seeking redevelopment to increase funding could make zoning
concessions in return for corporate funded environmental clean-up of an area.
See id. Because accessibility by customers is not at issue, this would be more
feasible for corporate headquarters than retail stores. This solution would not
allow corporations to seize any property they desired, but it would allow
development beneficial to both sides, without encountering community
opposition and litigation likely to tarnish the corporation's image, such as that
experienced by Best Buy in Walser.
176. While it approved the condemnation, the Michigan Supreme Court in
Poletown nevertheless recognized that heightened scrutiny should be applied
when the benefit to private interests is apparent. See Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Mich. 1981). But see
Thomas Ross, TransferringLand to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent
Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355, 374 (arguing that although improper
motivations can arise through takings for the benefit of private entities, those
benefits can also accrue through traditional public takings; therefore, if a
heightened level of scrutiny is employed, it should be used similarly in all
condemnation proceedings).
177. See Jones, supra note 132, at 301.
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178
decipher motivations because of the inherent difficulty.
Adding to the difficulty is that improper benefits to the private
entity are only a matter of degree; a private benefit incidental
or equal to the public benefit is proper if it does not dwarf the
public benefit. 179 Additionally, public benefits like jobs and tax
revenues may validly result from private benefits. 180 Under the
current framework, however, the extent of such benefits is
often speculative. Nevertheless, municipalities are willing to
gamble with such projects in an attempt to snatch them from a
rival municipality.181
Because they wield employment
opportunities and a large tax base, corporations clearly have
the upper hand in this financing war. Improper motivations
thus become an inevitable outcome of this struggle.
Despite the limitations and difficulties inherent in an
examination of motivations, such review is necessary because
of the importance of private property rights to the maintenance

178. See NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 15, § 7.03[11][b].
Sometimes improper motivations are obvious. One commentator discussed
what has become a common occurrence:
It has become a familiar scenario in redevelopment cases that an
owner of land located in an area with economic potential is
approached by a private developer with a purely private offer to buy
the former's land for the latter's plainly and concededly private profitmaking project. Yet, after the parties fail to make a consensual deal,
the local municipality miraculously appears on the scene, declares the
targeted land to be "blighted," announces a redevelopment project,
and proceeds to condemn the subject property for the very developer
who was unable or unwilling to buy it in a voluntary transaction at a
negotiated market price.
Kanner, supra note 22, at 95.
179. See Ross, supra note 176, at 373. Improper motivations may be
defined not only by the comparative weight of the public versus private
benefit, but may occur when the taking is to benefit a favored citizen or hurt a
disfavored citizen. See id. at 370-71. Such a scenario raises equal protection
questions, but under this doctrine, heightened scrutiny would only be
triggered if a suspect class, based on race or sometimes alienage, is the subject
of the discrimination. But see Jones, supra note 132, at 307-08 (arguing that
property rights should trigger strict scrutiny on the basis that they are
"fundamental" rights within the "penumbra" of the zone of privacy test).
180. For example, the Best Buy headquarters at issue in Walser will
provide 7,500 jobs and tax revenues from a $160 million complex. See supra
note 101.
181. Michael M. Schultz & F. Rebecca Sapp, Urban Redevelopment and the
Eliminationof Blight: A Case Study of Missouri's Chapter353, 37 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 58-59 (1990) ("Public use in the context of urban
redevelopment not only includes the elimination of slum and blighted areas
but also includes purely economic legislation designed to improve the fiscal
well-being of the city.").
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of democracy.' 82 The burden must be shifted to municipalities,
because they are likely to be swayed by the revenue potential
presented by corporations that dwarfs that of individual
landowners.
Municipalities should have to prove their
motivations are honorable, rather than forcing private citizens,
already fighting an uphill battle against corporations with clout
and resources, to prove the motivations are wholly improper.
B. POWER IMBALANCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY OWNERS REQUIRES REINFORCED DUE
PROCESS

Another factor implicating the ineptitude of the current
application of the public use requirement is evidenced by the
due process clause. The importance the Framers placed on
property ownership is reinforced by the language in the Fifth
Amendment that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 183 The current
framework does not come close to meeting this requirement.
The fact that the Framers listed property together with the
vital protections of life and liberty makes it clear that they
intended the process for a deprivation of property to be
significant.
The imbalance of power inherent in condemnation
proceedings raises questions about the sufficiency of due
process. Individual citizens, as homeowners and business
18 4
owners, typically face cities or city planning agencies.

182. Cf. infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the significance
with which the Framers' viewed property rights).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V. While this provision only applies to the
federal government, it extends to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The placement of this provision in
the Fifth Amendment rather than the enumerated power of Article I, section
8, may support the idea that the eminent domain power is inherent, not just
created by the Constitution, and should be broadly construed. Womack, supra
note 45, at 309 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875)). If the
Constitution does not grant but merely recognizes this power, then it should
be inhibited by few restraints. Id. (citing Steven R. Hobson, II, Preventing
Franchise Flight: Could Cleveland Have Kept the Browns by Exercising Its
Eminent Domain Power?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 665 (1996)). But see id. at 310
(recognizing that the "power of eminent domain is clearly limited by the
inclusion of public use within the terms of the Fifth Amendment" and that
"the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the concept as a limitation since
1896").
184. See, e.g., Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d
662, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
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Private landowners are at a disadvantage fighting against
cities with vast taxpayer revenues to pay good attorneys and to
appeal rulings.18 5 If a single private landowner's property is
taken, she may not have the money to challenge the city's
action in court. 8 6 This circumstance makes the concern over
insufficient due process higher than it would be for a group of
landowners who can divide costs. Furthermore, the minimal
standard of review exercised by many courts often employs a
presumption to accept any justification set forth by a city.187 To
the contrary, it seems that the power imbalance between cities
and private citizens requires more review than would typically
be due. Just as courts would not easily accept an abbreviated
process with a citizen's life or liberty, courts should similarly
reject this minimal process for property deprivations.
C. COURTS SHOULD SET A HIGHER BLIGHT STANDARD

The current blight framework, as a justification for a
taking, must be reexamined as incorporated into the public use
doctrine. Currently, most municipalities only require that an
area be characterized by one of the blight conditions to qualify
as blighted.' 88
1. Require More Deleterious Conditions for Blight
The first concern under the blight framework is the
potential for abuse. Due to the broad range of conditions and
the degree of subjectivity inherent in such an inquiry, cities can
characterize almost any area as blighted. 189 Residents and
commentators questioned the validity of the blight conditions
supposedly present at the Richfield site in Walser. 90° The city
averred that blight existed due to the proximity of car
185. But see supra note 101 (indicating that the prospering Walser Auto
Sales, Inc. and its contemporaries pursued seven lawsuits following the

Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Walser). The Walser auto dealership
paid at least $1.8 million in legal fees. Dan Wascoe, Jr., Walser Draws the
Line on Principle,STAR TRIB., Feb. 4, 2002, at D1.
186. See Broussard, supra note 26, at 99 (illustrating the bleak scenarios
faced by poor, displaced residents of a condemned neighborhood who would
lack the means to pursue a lawsuit).
187. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (listing the most commonly
cited deleterious conditions).
189. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
190. Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662,
668-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
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dealerships to residential homes, heavy traffic to the
dealerships, 19 1 noise created by public address systems, some
inadequate parking facilities, the lack of disabled access
outlined under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
obsolete mechanical systems. 2 Despite these problems, the
building consultant who prepared this analysis found that
"[t]he commercial spaces are not necessarily obsolete for their
present or continued use."'193 There is no evidence that the
dealerships were given the option to upgrade their facilities to
prevent the condemnation.
If given the choice between
condemnation and restoration, the dealerships likely would
have chosen to save their prospering businesses.194 Ironically,
the court supported the condemnation on blight grounds not
only because it fell within the broad statutory definition of
blight, but also because the "experience and knowledge of [city
of Richfield] staff, council and board members supported the
19 5
findings that conditions of blight existed in the Project area."
These assessments by the staff, council, and board of the city of
Richfield hardly constitute objective opinions. Employees of
the city fought to obtain the project for their suburb, rather
than lose it to a rival. 196 As a party to the case, the employees'
opinions should not be accepted uncontested. The decision of
the Minnesota Court of Appeals to give great weight to city
officials' opinions is not surprising, given its deference to
municipalities' findings. 197
A second concern under the blight framework is that
redeveloping an area that is not blighted not only does an
injustice to the existing property owners, but also has
additional harmful effects. As one commentator explained,
When the extraordinary powers of legislation designed to combat

191. Ironically, the corporate headquarters employing nearly 7,500 will
indisputably bring more traffic and pollution to the already congested area,
one of the primary concerns voiced by neighborhood residents. Dan Wascoe,
Jr., Best Buy is Ready to Begin Razing in Richfield, HeadquartersProject Gets
Last Remaining Permit and Will Proceed Despite Lawsuits, STAR TRIB., May

23, 2001, at B1.
192.
193.
194.

See Walser, 630 N.W.2d at 669.
Id.
See Walser, supra note 94 ("It is clear we do not want to leave.").

195.

Walser, 630 N.W.2d at 669.

196.

See Dan Wascoe, Jr., Best Buy Tension Rising in Richfield, STAR

TRIB., Feb. 18, 2001, at B1 ("City officials have.., declared some
neighborhoods blighted to promote redevelopment, which they say is necessary
to compete with other communities.").
197.

See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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blight and renew decayed urban areas are used as a fiscal device to
promote industrial, commercial, and business development in a
project area that is merely underdeveloped rather than blighted,
competitive speculation may be turned loose. By misemploying the
extraordinary powers of urban renewal, a redevelopment agency
captures pending tax revenues which it can then use as a grubstake
to subsidize commercial development within the project area in the
hope of striking it rich. 98

Overuse of the blight justification has the added
consequence of compelling taxpayers in one section of the
community to disproportionately subsidize those corporations
building to profit in areas that do not really need assistance.199
Tax dollars are used to fund redevelopment of blighted areas to
spread the burdens of improving the community.2 00 It is
improper to use this good faith effort forced on citizens to pay to
improve their communities for the benefit of wealthy
corporations rather than economically disadvantaged citizens.
Municipalities are acting in bad faith by misusing the blight
doctrine. 20 ' This misuse suggests abuse of the legislature's
20 2
intent to supply aid only for a dire need.
198. Tepper, supra note 24, at 36.
199. See Rogers, supra note 73, at 172 (stating that a strong objection to
public subsidies for areas that are not dangerously blighted "is that it benefits
an already privileged class-private developers-at the public's expense").
200. See Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 1005 (noting that property taxes are used
to fund redevelopment).
201. See Kanner, supra note 22, at 89 (implying that urban government
regularly abuses its power by seizing unoffending land to transfer to private
redevelopers at a subsidized price).
202. See Tepper, supra note 24, at 36 (noting the California state
legislature's "growing concern over the proliferation of redevelopment projects
in marginally blighted or nonblighted areas"). It seems apparent that this is
an area where legislatures prefer that courts limit the potential for abuse,
rather than exercise minimal review rationalized by deference for legislative
objectives. Certainly legislators, acting as representatives of the public, do not
want to bilk their constituents to line the pockets of wealthy, private
developers.
Another commentator argues that the entire blight justification for
private redevelopment is a sham, because developers would likely never be in
the market for truly blighted land. Kanner, supra note 22, at 90-91.
[N]o rational redeveloper would be interested in investing in truly
blighted land and building on it unless it is so located as to have a
promising potential for profitable redevelopment.
It is at best
questionable whether land with such potential would remain in its
"blighted" condition for very long if left to development or
redevelopment by private market forces.
Id.
Municipalities may be gambling with public financing for such
redevelopment efforts, although they claim the possible profits will serve a
public purpose. See id.
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One method of reform would require heightened review of
allegedly blighted conditions. 20 3 Another would require the
existence of multiple conditions, rather than just one to define
an area as blighted. 20 4 Given the broad range of conditions
contemplated under blight definitions, one can easily envision a
scenario where facts that could be construed to indicate one of
the conditions could be exaggerated to label an entire area as
blighted. For example, with proof of one building in need of
paint, a city could construe an entire block as blighted.
20 5
Currently, there are no limits to these broad concepts.
Under the existing deferential review exercised by courts, a
municipality's opinion of blighted conditions or evidence of bad
faith will not be thoroughly investigated. 20 6 This implicates
significant potential for exploitation.
2. Future Blight is an Inadequate Basis for a Taking
While courts have been slow to respond to overuse of the
blight definition, some have recognized the unjustifiably
speculative nature of the possibility of future blight as a
justification for redevelopment. 20 7 States like Minnesota that
favor broad acceptance of condemnations for redevelopment

Redevelopment is... a more effective and cheaper means of gaining
title to land the redevelopers covet. The public thus winds up
subsidizing private pursuit of profits, usually on the basis of
optimistic ... projections ... that the community at large will benefit
as the redevelopers grow rich. In fact, redevelopment projects ... can

be risky.
Id. at 91.

203. Such review could parallel strict scrutiny analysis described in supra
Part II.B.3.
204. State blight statutes, such as MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.002 subd. 11
(West 2001), only require the existence of one of the listed conditions to
categorize an area as blighted. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

205. Proponents of tax increment financing, which subsizides acquisition
and construction costs for redevelopment, acknowledge that while traditional
indicators of blight may not exist in an area, they want to redevelop the
property to achieve its "highest and best use." Rogers, supra note 73, at 162,

172 (citing Schultz & Sapp, supra note 181, at 27-28).
206.

See id. at 169.

207. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
No. CV 00-07572 SVW, 2001 WL 811056, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2001). The

court characterized such an argument as completely speculative and without
basis in California redevelopment law.

See id.; see also supra note 62 and

accompanying text. According to the court, the future blight rationale is an
untenable position because if blight remains latent, no site could ever be truly
free from it. See 99 Cents Only Stores, 2001 WL 811056, at *6.
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208
projects incorporate such speculative justifications as valid.
For example, the relevant Minnesota statute defines a
redevelopment project as "any work or undertaking" to "acquire
blighted areas and other real property for the purpose of
removing, preventing, or reducing blight, blighting factors, or
the causes of blight."20 9 This broad definition allows nonblighted real property to be redeveloped in the name of possibly
preventing a cause of blight or blight factor. 210 The scope of
this possibility is absurd.
It opens the door for any
municipality to argue that an area must be condemned simply
because it is possible that it could become blighted in the
future. 2 11 This type of legislation strips the Fifth Amendment's
due process protection of private property of any meaning.

D. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Finally, a purely policy argument for reforming the blight
doctrine concerns historic preservation. 2 12 The ease with which
municipalities currently condemn properties as blighted
reflects American society's reputation as disposable; Americans
tend to tear down and rebuild rather than restore or refurbish
old buildings. 21 3 While there is no evidence that the auto
dealerships and homes condemned in Walser had any
remarkable architectural value to warrant their preservation,
the concept of maintaining respect for existing structures is
what is at issue. The Best Buy corporate headquarters will
likely be more attractive than one of its big-box stores, 21 4 but
will hardly be worth preserving years from now when Best Buy
has no more use for the facility. The government's failure to
208. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
209. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.002, subd. 14(1) (West 2001) (emphasis
added).
210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
212. Federal regulations characterize "preservation" as "the act or process
of applying measures ... to sustain the existing form, integrity and materials
of an historic property." 36 C.F.R. § 68.2(a) (2001).
213. The National Register of Historic Places and federal legislation
requiring federal agencies to take historic resources into account are examples
of the effort to counter the depletion of historic buildings. See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER

&

JOHN

M.

PAYNE,

PLANNING

AND

CONTROL

OF

LAND

DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 789 (5th ed. 2001).

214. Best Buy is considered an extension of the big-box retailers, namely a
"category-killer" retailer. Truitt, supra note 59, at 38. Its stores are not
desirable neighbors, inviting the "not in my backyard" response by residents.
Id. at 40.
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archive the built environment for future generations is
reflected in the current ease with which redevelopers obtain
Unfortunately, many
land through eminent domain. 2 15
redevelopers cut corners on building costs, creating facilities
meant to last only a few decades. 216 While innovation is a
trademark of American democracy, government must not
ignore the value of preserving structures to safeguard a record
of American history.
E. REQUIRE CORPORATIONS TO RETURN PART OF THE BENEFIT
OF THE BARGAIN

Financing for redevelopment projects is another factor
courts should consider when determining whether public
benefits justify takings.
While judges are not typically
economists, and therefore cannot be expected to conduct indepth financial analyses, they can perform some simple
inquiries to provide reassurance that the takings are
2 17
justified.
1. Courts Should Conduct a Cost-Benefit Analysis
The first inquiry would measure the costs of a proposed
project versus the monetary benefits. 2 18 Costs paid by the
215. But see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (evidencing
legislative measures to preserve historic structures).
216. Cf. Truitt, supra note 59, at 40 (noting that communities are
concerned about the tendency of big-box users to abandon their stores, leaving
large, vacant buildings and deserted parking lots). But cf. Larry Werner,
When Boxes Die, Cities Get Creative, STAR TRIB., Mar. 17, 2002, at D1
(describing creative ways to use abandoned big-box stores ranging from
classroom space to a go-kart track).
217. Kulick, supra note 11, at 681.
218. Had the court in Walser undertaken this inquiry, it would have
recognized that some of the drawbacks of the proposed project included
increased traffic problems and the possible future consequence of sprawl.
Forcing homeowners out of residential neighborhoods in first ring suburbs,
which in the Twin Cities metro area approximate the crowded conditions of
the city, requires them to move farther out, adding to the burden on
infrastructure. See Laurie Blake, Richfield May Face Traffic Challenges, STAR
TRIB., Feb. 3, 2000, at 2B (describing the congested traffic conditions along I494 through the Twin Cities suburbs of Eden Prairie and Bloomington into
first ring suburbs Edina and Richfield).
Other policy considerations include the detrimental impact to a wellestablished community and the resulting powerlessness citizens feel. From an
urban planning perspective, big-box stores and corporate headquarters create
a bleak environment unfriendly to pedestrians and citizen interaction in the
community. See Truitt, supra note 59, at 40. Power centers housing big-box
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municipality to acquire and alter infrastructure for the site
219
should be weighed against the price paid by the corporation.
Additional effects such as detrimental impact on citizens and
the community, as well as future consequences like sprawl,
could also be considered to complete the analysis. A large
discrepancy in this comparison could create a strong
220
presumption that the taking is improper.
If such a rudimentary analysis reveals an imbalance in
favor of the private beneficiary, the project should be
invalidated. 22 1
Because this Note argues that wealthy
corporations should not be able to buy private property outside
the open market by commandeering the government's eminent
domain power, it seems inconsistent to argue that the private
beneficiary should be able to entice the city with more dollars.
A corporation should not be able to buy an unconstitutional
taking of land. If cities insist on using a broad construction of
public purpose, and courts continue to validate this
construction, 222 standards must insure that the public receives
its due benefit of the bargain.
If courts insist that
redevelopment and the resulting tax revenue is preferable,
courts must insure that the public receives part of the profit
that corporations will collect from the redevelopment scheme.
In the alternative, stricter requirements about payment of just
compensation by the private beneficiary might result in fewer
condemnation abuses. If corporations were required to pay just
compensation for a taking that is equal to the fair market value
of the land, private entities would not save money by using the
government's eminent domain power. 223 While corporations

chain stores are characterized by "traffic... both from cars and from the

trucks required to feed the retailing giants, and increased noise pollution,
trash and visual blight." Id. While one could argue that the problem already
existed in the traffic snarled Richfield neighborhood, the Best Buy
headquarters will exacerbate this condition.
219.
220.
221.

See Kulick, supra note 11, at 681.
See id. at 681-82.
See id. at 681-83.

222. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
223. See Lazzarotti, supra note 10, at 72 (urging that compensation reform
might have the effect of "minimizing the chance that a disproportionate
burden will fall on the condemnee"). The author paints a bleak scenario of
what could happen to an individual whose home is condemned after he or she
has struggled to keep up with high mortgage payments. Id. The person might

incur legal fees, moving expenses, and job search costs, causing her to struggle
to make ends meet. Id. at 72-73. Currently, takings compensation does not
include relocation costs. Id. at 72.
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would obtain the benefit of buying attractive sites not for sale
on the open market, the increased cost of litigating the
condemnation or the harm to their reputations might not be
worth the effort. 224 Raising the payment of just compensation
to pay
to equitable, market levels, and requiring corporations
225
it, would stop enticements to avoid the open market.
2. Financing Alternatives
Municipalities could use several methods to assure that the
public benefits from the blight classification. At the outset, the
practice cities use to pay corporations to take private property
away from home and business owners for redevelopment
projects should be invalidated. 226 This currently used method
is wholly improper and strips public use of its intended
meaning.
Second, as suggested above, corporations benefiting from
redevelopment could pay the cost of the taking. A commonly
voiced complaint is that the government "lowballs" property
values when paying just compensation for a taking. 227 The
downside of this proposal, however, is the appearance of
impropriety when a corporation directly pays a property owner
when she does not want to sell, but is forced to sell by the
government. An objective market appraisal price paid by the
developer, rather than the minimum paid by the government,
would provide equitable monetary compensation.
224. See id. at 73.
225. See Kulick, supra note 11, at 683-84.
226. The Best Buy project in the Walser case, for example, called for not
only condemning a neighborhood and transferring the property to Best Buy,
but the city also gave the company a forty-eight million dollar Tax Increment
Financing (TIF) subsidy. Rochelle Olson, Walser-Best Buy Suit Trial Begins,
STAR TRIB., Dec. 27, 2000, at B1. While it was too late to stop the
condemnation, the Minnesota Court of Appeals later held that the use of TIF
was invalid. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. See also Kanner,
supra note 22, at 95 (arguing that "when a project fails to justify its cost, it
should not be undertaken at all, rather then [sic] pursued by shortchanging
property owners and denying them a fair measure of their constitutionally
guaranteed just compensation").
227. Mississippi Churning,supra note 109; see also Kanner, supra note 22,
at 98-99 (arguing that "the most unjust aspect ...

is that ...

judges insist on

awarding the same parsimonious measure of damages, whereby they
consciously shortchange condemnees for a variety of losses indisputably
suffered but said by judges to be noncompensable, even when they are readily
compensible in other types of litigation"). Such losses include relocation costs
and sentimental value that are not generally measured in just compensation.
Lazzarotti, supra note 10, at 72.
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Another suggestion contemplates writing a provision into
the condemnation agreement that states if the private
beneficiary profits from its venture, the city would receive a
percentage of the profits for a fixed period of time. This would
guarantee that the private benefit would not exploit the public
medium it used to acquire profit.
Finally, should the
redeveloper's venture fail within a short period after acquiring
the property, 228 the property should revert back to the city if it
paid the initial bill. This time limit could be specifically set by
statute, or could be defined as a reasonable period of time later
determined by administrative or judicial review. Therefore, the
developer could not abuse the public use doctrine and also
acquire a windfall of the future market value of the site.
Additional benefits could result from increasing
compensation from the bare minimum. Less litigation might
229
result if property owners received adequate compensation.
While it is counter to the thesis of this Note to encourage
respect for private property takings for private developers, if
redevelopment projects must continue, just compensation at
market value secures endurable treatment for condemnees.
Pro-development critics would likely counter that these
proposals for increased financial accountability will cause
corporations to give up on projects and go elsewhere, taking
employment opportunities and tax bases with them. 23 0 This
gloomy scenario assumes that corporations will find other
municipalities with desirable sites and lenient public use
standards. Uniformity is the key to a workable solution. If
state legislatures require all municipalities to raise public use
and financing standards to hold private beneficiaries
accountable, then these private parties will not have the option
to find another city to exploit. Profit-seeking corporations are
not going to fold simply because they can no longer pilfer
property through the government's eminent domain power.
Corporations will be forced to find properties on the open
2 31
market or comply with the higher standards.

228. See Truitt, supra note 59, at 40 (referencing as an example the closing
of 110 KMart stores in 1994).
229. See Lazzarotti, supra note 10, at 73.
230. See Rogers, supra note 73, at 161 n.106 (mentioning the "fiscal wellbeing of the city" as a basis for a redevelopment project).
231. See Kulick, supra note 11, at 683-84 (discussing private market

alternatives).
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CONCLUSION
The modern treatment of the public use requirement badly
needs reform. If current trends continue, one can envision an
urban landscape dominated by corporate headquarters and bigbox chain stores, looming over their abutting blacktopped
parking lots. Financially strapped municipalities run by
politicians scared to impose unpopular tax hikes, will continue
to seek corporate tax revenues. Private takings will continue
unencumbered. Forced out of the urban core, homeowners will
be required to move farther and farther out, inducing the
inefficiencies of sprawl. While planning boards currently favor
such redevelopment efforts as beneficial, the long-term
implications are not so rosy.
Despite these dire predictions, reform is on the horizon.
Judges are beginning to curtail the abuse of the public use
doctrine. There is hope that the Supreme Court may revisit the
area. The proliferation of takings benefiting private parties
illustrates the urgent need to strictly construe the public use
clause.
The approach advocated by this Note stresses the need for
intensified judicial review of condemnation cases. Courts must
intervene because current private-to-private takings abuses
have to stop. Increased judicial vigilance is the solution to the
current rift that takings abuses create between citizens and
their municipal governments.
This effort needs uniform
implementation by legislatures and municipalities of stricter
standards of scrutiny, including factors unique to public-toprivate takings, due process, blight, and cost-benefit analyses.
While costs to courts from engaging in such analyses may be
high, such review is necessary to prevent abuses arising from
the current framework. These increased costs and burdens will
pay for themselves in the increased protection of private
property rights.
Curtailing abuse through stricter review has the added
benefit of preventing more takings that benefit private parties.
These condemnations authorized for private parties via the
government should be the exception and not the rule. Because
so many of these condemnations currently stem from improper
motivations, further review will curb their passage. Not only
will this increased diligence by courts decrease the number of
cases to review, but it will also restore meaning to the public
use language of the Takings Clause.

